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THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE, THE TWENTYFIRST AMENDMENT, AND A FREER WINE MARKET: WHY
KENTUCKY MUST WINE-DOWN ITS PROTECTIONIST
LAWS RESTRICTING THE DIRECT SHIPMENT OF WINE
FROM OUT-OF-STATE WINERIES

Aubrey K Vaughan*
I. INTRODUCTION: CHEERS TO A MORE OPEN WINE INDUSTRY

Prior to
wine market in the world.'
largest
the
is
States
United
he
Prohibition,
Kentucky was the third largest grape and wine
producing state in the country.? Following decades of harm to Kentucky's
agricultural industry through restrictions on the growth of major cash crops

T

like hemp and tobacco, Kentucky farmers have returned to viticulture in
hopes of redeveloping a viable and profitable industry for Kentucky farmers.

Unfortunately for consumers, the Kentucky legislature has gone too far
in attempting to foster the wine industry of the Commonwealth. Kentucky
wineries have been legally allowed to operate since 1976,' and due to
legislation enacted in 1996, they have also been protected from out-of-state
competition.' KRS § 244.165, as written in 1996, prohibited out-of-state
wineries from direct sales and shipments of wine to Kentucky consumers.s
This law showed signs of collusion between big government and big
business, severely limiting the individual consumer's access to the wine

market. The first red flag was that the law only applied to private
individuals;

alcohol

wholesalers

were

exempt

from

restrictions

on

importation of out-of-state wine. The second was that an individual could
' Articles Editor, KY. J. EQUINE AGRIc. &NAT. RESOURCES L., 2014-2015; B.A. 2012, Wake
Forest University; J.D. expected May 2015, University of Kentucky.
'2012 Wine Sales in US. Reach New Record: Record California Winegrape Crop to Meet Surging
Demand,Wine Institute (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.wineinstitute.org/resources/pressroom/04082013.
2 History, Kentucky Wine and Grape Council, http://www.kentuckywine.com/about/history/ (last
visited Oct. 14, 2013).
3

id.
1996 Ky. Acts 301.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 244.165 (West 2010).
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only import out-of-state wine after jumping through various hoops.
Specifically, a consumer had to go in person to the out-of-state winery,
purchase the wine on-site, ship the wine back to Kentucky through a
licensed common carrier, and ship no more than two cases per visit., Outof-state wineries that violated this law, upon their first offenses, would
receive cease and desist letters, and upon their second and subsequent
offenses, would be guilty of Class D felonies. 7 Wine wholesalers faced no
risk of criminal, let alone civil, penalties for receiving wine shipments.
Kentucky wine wholesalers favored the continued existence of this law
because it protected their ability to act as middlemen between the vineyards
and the consumers since wholesalers could legally import the wine and sell
it at a markup. Kentucky wineries also enjoyed protection from virtually no
out-of-state competition. This law, however, harmed consumers and
prevented a free and open wine market throughout the country; a market in
which the direct shipment of wine is a $1.35 billion industry today.'
According to a report by the Federal Trade Commission, "state bans on
internet direct shipping represent the single largest regulatory barrier to
expanded e-commerce in wine."' The report found that if these consumers
had been allowed to purchase the wine online instead of in a store, they
would have paid "8-13% less than the store price" for a $20 to $40 bottle of
wine and "20-21% less than the store price for wine that cost more than $40
per bottle."O Wineries across the country have distinctive products, and
many of the most desirable wines come from states like California, Oregon,
and Washington, which are all thousands of miles away from Kentucky."
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Granholm v. Heald,12 many
states' wine-shipping laws have come under close scrutiny, review, and
7

Id.
' Greg Bensinger, Wine: the Web's Final Frontier,Wall Street Journal (Oct. 26, 2012, 6:19 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/artides/SB10000872396390444592704578067270510751116?mod=google
news-ws.
' Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Staff Report Concerning Possible Anticompetitive Barriers to Eat
FTC
Report],
available
Wine
3
(July
2003)
[hereinafter
Commerce:
http://www.ftc.gov/policy/policy-actions/advocacy-filings/2003/07/ftc-staff-report-concerningpossible-anticompetitive.
"See Huber Winery v. Wilcher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 592, 598 (W.D. Ky. 2006).
12 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
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litigation. Granholm arose from out-of-state wineries coming into conflict

with Michigan and New York statutes, both of which had the same effect
of severely limiting wine shipments into their states." Michigan allowed
Michigan wineries to ship to Michigan consumers, but out-of-state
wineries could only ship to Michigan wine wholesalers. 14 New York
technically allowed out-of-state wineries to ship to New York consumers,
but the state "required [wineries] first to establish a factory, office, or
storeroom in New York," creating a heavy burden on out-of-state wineries
to which in-state wineries were not subject."s The Supreme Court struck
down these laws because they violated the Dormant Commerce Clause."6 A
number of subsequent cases reached similar results. One such case was
Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, a Sixth Circuit decision. As this Note
will later discuss, Cherry Hill held a portion of Kentucky's law to be an
unconstitutional violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause." Yet, the law
partially remains in effect in Kentucky. The remaining part, which prohibits
a winery from shipping more than two cases of wine to a consumer, also
appears to conflict with the Dormant Commerce Clause as a burden on
interstate commerce. s Another hurdle for out-of-state wineries to
overcome is navigating the laws of the dry, moist, and wet counties in
Kentucky. KRS § 242.260 makes each package of alcohol a common carrier
ships into Kentucky a separate offense. " Rather than face potential
violations, many common carriers have refused to ship wine to any
Kentucky county at all.20
This note will seek to encourage the Kentucky General Assembly to
clarify the law in light of Granholm and Cherry Hill to open the wine market
in Kentucky for the benefit of consumers, increase competition for the
benefit of better agricultural products in Kentucky, end the
13Id. at 466-67.
" Stuart Banner, Granbolm v. Heald:A Case of Wine and a ProhibitionHangover,2004-05in Cato
Sup. Ct. Rev. 263, 266 (2005).
15 id.
16 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492-93.
17 Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423
(6th Cir. 2008).
18 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 244.165 (West 2010).
19 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 242.260 (West 2013).
20
State
Shipping
Laws
for
Wineries:
Kentucky,
Wine
Institute,
http://wineinstitute.shipcompliant.com/StateDetail.aspx?Stateld=50 (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
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unconstitutional protection of Kentucky's vineyards from out-of-state
competition, and eliminate liability for common carriers shipping wine into
the Commonwealth. The General Assembly should either draft a resolution
to clarify the current law in the state, or amend prior statutes to clarify the
current state of law for out-of-state wineries. Doing so will work against the
protectionist interests of Kentucky wineries and wholesalers, but will benefit
Kentucky consumers by providing a free and open market.
II. A PERFECT PAIRING: USING THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
AND A HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
AMENDMENT TO HELP FREE THE WINE MARKET
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to "regulate
commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."" The counterpart to the Commerce Clause is the Dormant
Commerce Clause. While not textually expressed in the Constitution, it is
"the principle that state and local laws are unconstitutional if they place an
undue burden on interstate commerce." 22 There is no constitutional
provision that explicitly lays out the Dormant Commerce Clause; rather, it
derives from two sources: an inverse inference from the Commerce Clause
and Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden. Chief
Justice Marshall wrote, "when a state proceeds to regulate commerce ...
among the several States, it is exercising the very power that is granted to
Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to
do." 23 Essentially, the power serves as a barrier from "jurisdictional
overreaching by the states," limiting "the ability of states to impede the flow
of interstate commerce."24 The Court adopted the Dormant Commerce
Clause in order to prevent a reversion to the economic protectionism that
was rampant under the Articles of Confederation, which reduced
§ 8, cl. 3.
* Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 430 (4th ed. 2011).
23 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 199-200 (1824).
2 Dan L. Burk, How State Regulation of the Internet Violates the Commerce Clause, 17 Cato J. 147,
at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/fsles/serials/files/catoavailable
(Fall
1997),
153
journal/1997/11/cj17n2-2.pdf.
21U.S. Const. art. I,
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competition and drove up prices.25 The Dormant Commerce Clause does
not entirely prevent states from regulating commerce, 26 but it does prevent
states from discriminating against commerce "solely on the basis of the
[object's] geographic origin."27
The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits two categories of laws:
facially neutral laws (also called facially non-discriminatory laws) and

facially discriminatory laws. Facially neutral laws are laws that do not appear
to discriminate based on the text, or "face" of the law. They do, however,
discriminate when applied. Facially discriminatory laws, conversely, are laws
that expressly differentiate between in-state and out-of-state commerce,
such as laws placing "out-of-state businesses at a disadvantage compared to
in-state businesses or act[ing] to help in-state businesses at the expense of
out-of-state businesses." 28 The Dormant Commerce Clause blocks such
discriminatory regulation "by its nearly per se rule prohibiting even facially
nondiscriminatory regulation that is overly burdensome to interstate
commerce." 29
The Dormant Commerce Clause can be justified in three major ways:
historically, economically, and politically. The historical justification for the
Dormant Commerce Clause lies in the fact that the "framers intended to
prevent state laws that interfered with interstate commerce."o According to
constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky, it can be "inferred from this
history that the framers meant to prevent such protectionist state
legislation.""1 As Justice Robert Jackson explained in his opinion in H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond,

2s id

' See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 447 U.S. 131 (1986) (holding states can exclude commerce if there is
a legitimate environmental purpose and there are no available non-discriminatory means to pursue that
end); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (holding states can prohibit certain
commerce, even if it has a discriminatory effect against out-of-state producers and favorable effects on
in-state producers, if the discriminatory effects are only incidental to the law's purpose to protect
environmental interests).
27 Burk, supra note 25, at 153.

28Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 442.
29Burk, supra note 25, at 154.

* Chemerinsky, supranote 23, at 432.
" Id. at 432-33.
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[o]ur system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that
every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to
produce by the certainty that he will have free access to
every market in the Nation .

. .

. Likewise, every consumer

may look to the free competition from every producing area
in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any.
Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the
doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.32
The economic justification for the Dormant Commerce Clause, as
Professor Chemerinsky explained, is that "[t]he economy is better off if
state . . . laws impeding interstate commerce are invalidated."" The logic
behind this statement is that if "a state acts to help itself at the expense of
other states, the other states are sure to retaliate with protectionist
legislation of their own."34 Furthermore, protectionist laws stifle production,
retard innovation, and harm the overall economy.
The political justification for the Dormant Commerce Clause is that
the American system does not desire to punish citizens of one state with the
laws of another state in which those citizens lack political representation.3 5
Therefore, the Court has the power to invalidate laws that impede the
political process for those without representation in that state. As Justice
Marshall wrote in McCulloch v. Maryland:

[s]tates have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard,
impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations
of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into
execution the powers vested in the general government.
This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that
supremacy which the constitution has declared. 6

H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525,539 (1949).
Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 433.
3 Id.
32

1

31 McCulloch

v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436 (1819).
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As Justice Harlan Stone wrote over a century later in South Carolina
Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., "when the regulation is of

such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the
state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political
restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects
adversely some interests within the state."
A. Le Vin-dication ofthe Wine Market Through the DormantCommerce
Clause

In applying the Dormant Commerce Clause to state statutes, it
logically follows that a protectionist state law may be "challenged on the
ground that it excessively burdens commerce among the states."" States
should not have the power to impede commerce across their state lines,
especially through such discriminatory means as discouraging commerce
from outside states. Specifically, as the Dormant Commerce Clause applies
to alcohol laws, some argue that laws restricting the sale of alcohol are not
actually a burden on commerce, but rather, a constitutional police power
regulation of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of that state. This
tension between the Dormant Commerce Clause and state police powers is
confusing, since Gibbons does not provide a clear answer as to what to do
when a state law enacted through the use of the state's police power violates
the Dormant Commerce Clause. 3
Most would agree that, despite mixed views on the effectiveness of the
law itself, a law preventing underage drinking is a valid exercise of police
power. If we assume that the prevention of underage drinking is a
legitimate state interest, then the issue becomes whether banning the
shipment of wine into a state is the least restrictive means by which this
interest can be achieved. Whether the burden will be tolerated depends on
the "nature of the local interest involved" and on "whether [that interest]
could be promoted [just] as well with a lesser impact on interstate
S.C. Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938).
" Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 430.
3
Id. at 436.
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activities."40 There is a presumption of unconstitutionality for state laws that
discriminate against out-of-staters. The discriminatory law will only be
upheld if the state can show that "the law is necessary - the least restrictive
means - to achieve a nonprotectionist purpose."41 Laws that facially
"discriminate against interstate commerce face a virtually per se rule of
invalidity." 42 In other words, the Court will balance "whether the benefits of
the state law outweigh its burdens on interstate commerce."43 A court's
determination that a particular law discriminates against interstate
commerce, however, does not end the inquiry into the constitutionality of
the law.44
B. The HangoverEffect ofProhibition:ProtectionistLaws and the Eighteenth
and Twenty-firstAmendments

Historically, alcohol prohibitions have not had much success. With the
temperance movement gaining steam in the nineteenth century, individual
states began banning alcohol. The states, however, could not ban the
importation of alcohol into their states through legislation because courts
would strike such bans down as violations of the Dormant Commerce
Clause. Congress reacted to this issue by using its Commerce Clause
powers to first enact the Wilson Act in 1890, which was meant to treat
imported alcohol the same as in-state alcohol. 4 The Court's loose
interpretation of this law allowed consumers to easily circumvent it.
Consequently, Congress enacted the Webb-Kenyon Act in 1913. Many
correctly predicted that this law would herald a dry country within ten
years. 46 The Act stated that the "shipment or transportation, in any manner
or by any means whatsoever, of any .. . intoxicating liquor of any kind from
* Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137,142 (1970).
4 Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 460.
4 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476.
4 Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 439.
4 Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp.2d at 596.
4 Banner, supra note 15, at 271-72.
' U.S. Dry Within Ten Years"; So Say ProhibitionistsAfter Webb-Kenyon Decision; - Liquor Dealers
Say It
Will React in Their Favor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1917, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9A00E4D6163AE433A25757C1A9679C946696D6C
F.
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one State . .. into any other State . .. in violation of any law of such State..

. is prohibited."4 7 This permitted states to outright prohibit alcohol, and
read literally, the Webb-Kenyon Act "did indeed authorize . . .
discrimination: liquor imported into a state, contrary to the state's
protectionist legislation, would literally have been imported 'in violation of
the law of such State."4 8 Again, however, this act was only meant to apply to
states that had elected to become dry-not to allow for distinctions between
in-state and out-of-state alcohol. In fact, the South Carolina Supreme
Court held in 1916 that the Webb-Kenyon Act "was not intended to
confer, and did not confer upon any State, the power to make injurious
discriminations against the products of other States."4 9 In short, the Act was
not intended to authorize states to discriminate against out-of-state alcohol
importation.
In 1920, the Prohibition era officially began with the ratification of the
Eighteenth Amendment. Section One of the Eighteenth Amendment
prohibited the "manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the
United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for
beverage purposes."o The Eighteenth Amendment was rather short lived,
as it was repealed thirteen years later with the ratification of the Twentyfirst Amendment in 1933. Despite the Twenty-first Amendment's repeal of
Prohibition, the United States still feels the effects of the era today.
Section One of the Twenty-first Amendment repealed the prohibition
on the manufacture and sale of alcohol, but went on to state in Section Two
that the "transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."s' Section
Two's ambiguous grant of power has "generated a steady flow of
litigation."52 Many states have interpreted this provision as a loophole
47 27

U.S.C. § 122 (1913).

Banner, supra note 15, at 277 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 122).
4 Brennan v. S. Express Co., 106 S.C. 102,90 S.E. 402, 404 (1916).
so U.S. Const. amend. XVIII, § 1.
" U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2.
52 Banner, supra note 15, at 263.
48
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through which they have enacted state laws pertaining to the transportation
or importation of alcohol into their states. Section Two does indeed seem to
textually allow states to constitutionally prohibit "whatever [actions]
relating to liquor importation the states already forbid, even [actions]
protected by federal statutes or other parts of the Constitution."5 3 For
approximately fifty years after the ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment, that reading prevailed.54
Since 1980, the Court has focused on the history of the Twenty-first
Amendment rather than the language of the provision itself.ss The Court
now posits that "Section [Two does] not authorize a state to favor local
interests by erecting trade barriers." 6 In the context of regulations on
alcohol, this means that laws that are mere economic protections are "not
entitled to the same deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils
of an unrestricted traffic in liquor."57 Section Two was not meant to permit
"[s]tates to regulate the direct shipment of wine on terms that discriminate
in favor of in-state producers."5 Rather, Section Two was meant to give
states the authority to design and implement uniform systems of regulation
to handle the transportation and importation of alcohol through their
states.s' History suggests the Twenty-first Amendment was meant to
"supersede some specific . . . Supreme Court cases interpreting the
Commerce Clause, not to supersede the entire Constitution." 6o Its
legislative history never mentioned that the Twenty-first Amendment was
intended to "go beyond the Webb-Kenyon Act and allow states to
discriminate against out-of-state liquor."' The states had no such power
prior to prohibition, and no legislative history suggests Congress intended
for states to have that power following the Twenty-first Amendment.62

54

Id. at 281.
s Id. at 281 (quoting California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97, 106-07 (1980)).
6
' Id. at 281.
" Id. (quoting Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984)).
ss Granholm, 544 U.S. at 475.
59Id. at 484.
* Banner, supra note 15, at 263.
61 Id. at 278-79.
6' Id. at 279.
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Based on the Amendment's historical context, courts should read Section
Two to mean that states may restrict out-of-state liquor just as they restrict
their own, but states may not regulate out-of-state liquor more strictly than
they regulate their own without violating the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Non-uniform laws discriminating against out-of-state wineries are
therefore now not allowed under Section Two, 6 even though such
differential treatment has been common since the adoption of the Twentyfirst Amendment.64 Case law beginning in the 1980s returned to this
contextual interpretation of the Amendment, explaining that "the Twentyfirst Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the Constitution
and, in particular, does not displace the rule that [s]tates may not give a
discriminatory preference to their own producers."" A state could choose to
ban the sale and consumption of alcohol altogether, in which case, that state
could ban the importation of all alcohol.66 States also may use state-run
alcohol stores or tiered systems to sell alcohol to consumers." However, a
law that merely discriminates against out-of-state commerce to benefit instate commerce is not constitutional and is not protected under Section
Two of the Twenty-first Amendment.
In Granholm v. Heald, the petitioners challenged Michigan and New
York laws that allowed in-state wineries to directly ship to consumers, but
did not extend this privilege to out-of-state wineries. Petitioners argued
that this was a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. This directly
pitted "a literal, textualist reading of the Twenty-first Amendment against a
contextual, originalist reading." 68 The Justices had to decide between
adhering to old case law and a textualist reading of Section Two, or
following new case law and adopting a contextual reading of Section Two.
Everyone concurred that "the statutes at issue would have been
unconstitutional if the regulated commodity [had been] anything other

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 485.
Banner, supra note 15, at 282.
6 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 486.
66 Id. at 488-89.
6' Id. at 489.
6' Banner, supranote 15, at 282.
6
1Id. at 284.
6

64
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than alcohol."7 ' For example, "[i]f the product were cheese rather than wine,
[a state] would not be able either to close its borders to imports or to insist
that the shippers collect its taxes." 7 However, the issue at hand was
"whether the Twenty-first Amendment create[d] an exception allowing
states to discriminate where the product involved is liquor,"n allowing the
states to "permit in-state wineries to ship directly to customers but forbid
out-of-state wineries from doing so."73
Under a textualist reading of Section Two, the out-of-state shipment
of wine into Michigan and New York was very clearly an "importation into
[the] State . . . for . . . use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the

laws thereof."74 On the other hand, when Section Two is read in its
historical context, "it is apparent that Section Two was not intended to
authorize states to discriminate against out-of-state producers,"' if the state
was not equally discriminating against its own producers. By a five-to-four
vote, the Supreme Court ruled these laws unconstitutional, explaining that
the "straightforward attempt to discriminate in favor of local producers ...
[was] contrary to the Commerce Clause."" If a state allows its in-state
wineries to ship to in-state consumers, then it must also "allow out-of-state
wineries to do the same." The Twenty-first Amendment "was intended to
level the playing field between in-state and out-of-state liquor, not [to]
authorize states to discriminate against out-of-state liquor producers."78
After Granholm, a state's only obligation is "to treat in-state and out-ofstate wineries equally." 79 Following this case, many states with laws similar
to those of Michigan and New York extended direct shipping of wine to
both in-state and out-of-state shippers."0 States can also either forbid any
direct shipping from in-state and out-of-state wineries entirely or apply
Id. at 264.
n Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2000).
' Banner, supranote 15, at.264.
7 Id. at 263.
7 U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2.
. Banner, supra note 15, at 269.
76 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
n Banner, supranote 15, at 264.
" Id. at 282.
" Id. at 284.
" See Alexandra Thompson, Note, The Legacy of Granholm v. Heald: Questioning the
ConstitutionalityofFaciallyNeutralDirect-ShippingLaws, 61 Case W. Res. 309, 311 (2010).
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less-restrictive regulations to them equally," though neither of these seems
to be a politically popular option.
C. Refining the Palette:Applying Strict Scrutiny
While Granholm appears to have clarified the Section Two issue, a
state's direct shipment laws could still be constitutional if they "advance a
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives." 82 One of the systems that states have
implemented to allegedly advance these legitimate local interests is a threetiered distribution system. This system is structured so that alcohol
producers can only sell to wholesalers, wholesalers can only sell to retailers,
and only retailers can sell directly to the consumer." States argue this makes
it easier to prevent underage drinking, facilitate tax collection, and promote
temperance.84
Rather than promoting any of these interests, it seems the three-tiered
system is another example of a protectionist state government colluding
with business. The only interest it might accomplish with this three-tiered
model is to "promote temperance indirectly, by raising prices" 85 and
"reduc[ing] the consumer's range of choice""' as a result of having two
middlemen between the producer and the consumer, who both mark up
prices and maintain limited inventories. It seems like a strange combination
to have temperance supporters and liquor wholesalers on the same side of
the fight, but both stand to benefit from state insulation resulting in higher
liquor prices-respectively, fewer people will be willing to spend that money
to drink alcohol and liquor stores can sell the same product for a higher
price. The real purpose behind the three-tiered system appears to be for
states to be able to protect their wholesalers and retailers from competition,
two groups that "stand to lose revenue if out-of-state wineries can bypass

at Banner, supra note 15, at 284.
82 New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,278 (1988).
93 Banner, supra note 15, at 264.
84id.
86Id.
6

1

Id. at 265.
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them and sell directly to in-state customers."" As Judge Frank Easterbrook
explained, the tiered system seems to be a euphemistic mechanism "for
reducing competition."" Granholm, however, does not invalidate the threetiered system, though this might be a major issue in future litigation, as
Granholm relied on the same "late-1930s cases repudiated in Granholm" to
justify the continuance of the tiered-system. 9
There has long been an exception to the three-tiered system, though,
which is the subject of this note: small wineries have long been able to sell
on-site directly to consumers. Prior to the Internet, this did not create
much more than a niche market. With the growth of online shopping,
however, this exception has allowed "small sellers and small buyers of wine
to find one another despite being physically far apart."o Regardless of this
potential market, Kentucky, Michigan, and New York all set up
protectionist legislation against it. The aforementioned states articulated
three main interests in their protectionist statutes: (1) preventing underage
drinking, (2) facilitating tax collection, and (3) maintaining the integrity of
dry counties.
1.

Interest One: Preventing Underage Drinking

The primary interest identified by both Michigan and New York in
Granholm, and Kentucky in its statute, is to prevent minors from purchasing
wine online. The Supreme Court rejected this interest for a number of
reasons. First, the Court found that minors are less likely to purchase wine
over beer or liquor.9 1 Second, minors have several more direct means of
obtaining alcohol than through shipment.9 2 According to a Federal Trade
Commission study, states that allow direct wine shipments "reported no
problems with minors' increased access to wine . . . [as] minors are less

s7 Id. at 267.
as Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 851.
"Banner, supra note 15, at 284-85.
'0 Id. at 266.
9 Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Hudgins, 488 F. Supp. 2d 601, 620 (W.D. Ky. 2006), af'd
Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008).
92 id.
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likely to consume wine, as opposed to wine coolers, beer, and hard liquor."93
As explained in Cherry Hill Vineyards, the market targeted by KRS §
244.165 is the small farm winery market.94 There simply is not evidence
that "the youth of Kentucky will seek out shipment of wines in this
boutique market."" Even if the direct shipment of wine could somewhat
increase the risk of underage drinking, the Court held that there were less
restrictive means to advance that state interest, such as requiring adult
signatures for delivery and labeling of the product. In fact, the National
Conference of State Legislatures' Model Direct Shipping Bill for-wine
"requires an adult signature on delivery and a label so instructing on each
package."" It would be no more difficult for courier to check a customer's
identification than it is for a liquor store or bar to do the same.98 Besides, a
ban on only out-of-state wine sales would not prevent an underage drinker
from simply ordering from an in-state winery instead, which clearly
undermines the logic of the articulated state interest. It seems much more
likely that "preventing underage drinking" is merely a fagade for
protectionism." With less restrictive means available, and a complete lack
of evidence that the law succeeds in preventing underage drinking, these
laws will not survive strict scrutiny under this interest.
2. Interest Two: FacilitatingTax Collection

A second major interest advanced by Michigan, New York, and
Kentucky is that the restrictions on imported wines facilitate tax collection
and prevent tax evasion in their states. In Granholm, however, Justice
Anthony Kennedy explained that the Tax and Trade Bureau has the

" FTC Report, supra note 10, at 12.

94Author note: A small farm winery is defined as a winery producing no more than 50,000
gallons of wine (or about 21,000 cases) annually. See R. Corbin Houchins, Results from Federal District
Court
in
Kentucky,
SHIP
COMPLIANT
BLOG
(Dec.
27,
2006),
http://shipcompliantblog.com/blog/2006/12/27/results-from-federal-district-court-in-kentucky.
s Cberry Hill Vineyards, LLC, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
See id. (quoting Granbolm, 544 U.S. at 490).

96

9 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491.
9 See Banner, supranote 15, at 267.
9 Id.
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authority to issue and revoke a winery's federal license for tax violations.' 00
Furthermore, the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act allows a state
attorney general to sue a winery for tax violations.10' States can also use
their regulatory authority to build state licensing bureaus to further prevent
tax evasion and use online technology to track wineries and run background
checks.' 02 There is simply not enough evidence to show that the legitimate
state interest in tax collection must be achieved through prohibitions on
out-of-state direct shipments, and less restrictive means likely exist. For
example, "[1]icensees could be required to submit regular sales reports and
to remit taxes," as sanctioned by the National Conference of State
Legislatures in the Model Direct Shipping Bill.'
3. Interest Three: Maintainingthe Integrity ofDry Counties

Another state interest that Kentucky identified in restricting direct
shipments from out-of-state wineries is protecting the integrity of its dry
counties. It is true that "the Twenty-First Amendment allows the states to
'address the moral concerns that underlay Prohibition, freeing them to
impose temperance in the consumption of alcoholic beverages."' 104
Furthermore, the Kentucky General Assembly freely permits counties to
participate in elections to determine whether a county will be dry. There
seems to be no legitimate reason for restricting out-of-state shipments of
wine, but not in-state shipments of wine. For a state to allow "in-state
wineries to ship directly to consumers . . . while prohibiting out-of-state

wineries from doing the same has no differential effect on the shipment of
wine into dry territories" because the Kentucky statute "discriminates based
upon where the wine originates, not upon where it ends up."'0 o While
maintaining the integrity of dry counties is a legitimate interest, there is no
reason to discriminate against a shipment of wine because it came from out
"0Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492.
101Id.
102 id
103 Id.

at 491-92.

"Huber Winery, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 596 (quoting Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir.
2003)).
105

Id. at 596-97.
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of state and not apply the same rule to a shipment of wine that came from
inside the state. In other words, "the in-state eligibility requirements are not
narrowly tailored towards achieving temperance in dry territories."1 6

It

seems certain that a more relaxed direct shipping law can easily coexist with
local option laws.

III. KENTUCKY CANNOT HAVE ITS WINE AND DRINK IT Too:
STATUTORY APPLICATION

Though the statute has improved since its inception in 1996, there are
still several issues with KRS § 244.165.107 The statute reads:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, it
shall be unlawful for any person in the business of selling
alcoholic beverages in another state or country to ship or
cause to be shipped any alcoholic beverage directly to any
Kentucky resident who does not hold a valid wholesaler or
distributor license issued by the Commonwealth of
Kentucky.
(2) A small farm winery located in another state may ship

wine to a customer in Kentucky if:
(a) The wine is purchased by the customer in person at
the winery;
(b) The wine is shipped by licensed common carrier;
and
(c) The amount of wine shipped is limited to two (2)
cases per customer per visit.
(3) Any person who violates subsection (1) of this section
shall, for the first offense, be mailed a certified letter by the
department ordering that person to cease and desist any
shipments of alcoholic beverages to Kentucky residents,

1

" Id. at 597.
' Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 244.165 (West 2010).
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and for the second and each subsequent offense, be guilty
of a Class D felony.
All of this statute is still valid except for section (2)(a), which Cherry Hill
Vineyards, LLC v. Hudgins struck down. The District Court applied strict
scrutiny to the in-person requirement and found that it discriminated
against small, out-of-state wineries without adequately advancing a
legitimate state interest that could not be served by less restrictive means.
The requirement burdened out-of-state wineries because Kentucky
customers would have to travel dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of
miles to purchase the wine, while simultaneously protecting Kentucky
wineries from outside competition, and it clearly benefitted Kentucky wine
wholesalers since they could charge higher markups as a result.
A.

Should CherryHill Have Gone Farther?

While Kentucky purported to evenhandedly apply its law to all small
wineries, the law imposed an often unfeasible in-person requirement to
small, out-of-state wineries. As Judge Charles Simpson explained in Cherry
Hill Vineyards, the largest concentration of small wineries is along the West
Coast of the United States. Conditioning wine purchases on personally
going to the wineries essentially deprives Kentucky consumers of access to
the small winery market because most people would be unable or unwilling
to make the trip. While "[i]t is true that the Commerce Clause does not
require that out-of-state wineries be granted the exact same economic
advantages as in-state wineries . . . the in-person requirement as it operates
here is protectionist and cannot stand . . . [and t]he court rejects the

contention that this is a matter of mere geographic happenstance." 10
Therefore, section (2)(a) could not stand because it violated the Dormant
Commerce Clause.

"' CherryHill Vineyards, LLC, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 619.
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The District Court, though, did not strike down sections (2)(b) or
(2)(c).'09 It would be prudent to consider section (2)(c) in further detail
because it appears that there may be facially neutral discrimination present.
The Twenty-first Amendment does not allow states to "ban, or severely
limit, the direct shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously
authorizing direct shipment by [in-state] producers.""o Many out-of-state
wineries are hurt by the two-case per order limit. Wine is not easy to ship,
and it is expensive and tedious to ship small orders across the country. It is
unfair to give wholesalers a protectionist advantage over private consumers.
To truly open up the wine shipping market, this statutory limitation should
also be struck down as a burden on commerce in violation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause.
States might retort that this situation is analogous to cigarette sales. In
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki,the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a law that eliminated "all sales of cigarettes to New York
consumers that do not involve face-to-face sales or the transportation of
fewer than four cartons of cigarettes to any one consumer.""' The Second
Circuit explained that this law was constitutional because it only prohibited
"one manner in which cigarettes could . . . be sold to New York

consumers.""' That is not applicable here. Wines are distinguishable from
cigarettes in that cigarettes are a much more fungible and easily transferable
product. Most wines are produced outside of Kentucky, and while Kentucky
has a variety of grape crops that can be successfully grown in its climate,
most varieties either cannot even be grown in the state or have a different
taste due to local factors like soil and weather. Regardless of the merits of
New York's law, a good like cigarettes is much different from artisan wines,
a product that likely incorporates the work of several farmers, sommeliers,
and scientists. In simpler terms, "no two wines are created equal.""'
" R. Corbin Houchins, Resultsfrom Federal DistrictCourt in Kentucky, SHIP COMPLIANT BLOG
(Dec. 27, 2006), http://shipcompliantblog.com/blog/2006/12/27/results-from-federal-district-court-inkentucky.
n0 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 493.
n' Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 213 (2d Cir. 2005).
112 id.
113 Huber Winery, 488

F.Supp.2d at 599 (quoting Plaintiffs Response to Defendants'
Supplemental Brief (DN 95), at 7).
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While Cherry Hill left section (2)(c) alone, holding that a two-case
maximum was not a substantial burden on interstate commerce, it plainly
appears to be differential treatment toward an out-of-state winery. State
laws are considered to violate the Dormant Commerce Clause when the
state economically benefits an in-state interest and burdens an out-of-state
interest.11 In this light, it seems impossible to look at a statute severely
limiting the number of cases a Kentucky resident can import from out of
state, while placing no equal limitation on the number of cases a Kentucky
resident can import from inside the state, and still find that no differential
treatment exists. KRS Chapter 244 contains no restriction on the number
of cases a Kentucky winery can ship to a consumer. There are also no
restrictions on the number of cases any winery can ship to a wholesaler. The
power of a state to regulate under Section Two of the Twenty-first
Amendment "does not allow States to ban, or severely limit, the direct
shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously authorizing direct
shipment by in-state producers."'s If Kentucky wants to limit the number
of cases a winery can ship to a customer, it must place an equal limitation
on in-state wineries as well, or else not apply the limitation to any winery at
all. For Kentucky to move away from protectionism and toward consumer
interests and demand, then KRS § 244.165(2)(c) must be struck down.
B. How Should Kentucky and Common CarriersDeal With Dry and Moist
Counties?

Assuming, arguendo, that Kentucky becomes friendlier toward allowing
importation of out-of-state wine, the Kentucky legislature will also have to
address KRS § 242.260 and KRS § 242.280. KRS § 242.260 makes it
illegal for any private or public carrier to deliver alcohol into any dry or
moist country," 6 and each package of alcohol constitutes a separate offense.

11

See Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).

us5Id. at 493.
116

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 242.260

(West 2013).
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n1 Furthermore, under KRS § 242.280, it is illegal for a person in a dry
country to receive an alcoholic beverage from a common carrier.
Additionally, both of these statutes again exempt liquor wholesalers from
the rules, so long as the wholesaler is not distributing the alcohol in the dry
county.
Kentucky has dry, wet, moist (i.e., a dry county that allows alcohol on
its golf course), and combination dry/wet (i.e., some voting precincts are
wet and some are dry) counties. Many common carriers refuse to ship wine
into Kentucky at all because of the complicated system this creates."' If
Kentucky does begin to allow out-of-state wine shipments, then the
Kentucky General Assembly should act to ease or eliminate the penalties
for common carriers that deliver alcohol to dry counties. If the General
Assembly does not choose to act on this, a regulatory solution also exists.
One potential method would be that during the process of licensing farms
and small wineries, the licensing agency could "specifically identify the
counties, cities, and/or zip codes in [the state] to which shipments cannot
be made."' 20
There is also some pre-Prohibition case law suggesting that private
consumers in dry counties may have alcohol for their own consumption,
and common carriers will not be penalized for delivering it, so long as the
sale of the alcohol does not occur in that county.12' One of the main
purposes of having a dry county is to protect the social morality against
drinking-but just because a county is dry does not mean alcohol cannot be
consumed there, merely that alcohol cannot be sold there. If a private
consumer is allowed to imbibe his out-of-county alcohol in a dry county,
then why not allow the shipment of alcohol into that county? The sales
"' Author note: The offense for which a person will be guilty is that of nuisance, and the penalty
is the property used to deliver the alcohol must be forfeited to the state. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 242.310
(West 1942).
us Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 242.280 (West 2013).
119 See Wine
Shipping State Pairing Guide, FedEx, https://www.fedex.com/cgibin/wineShipping.cgi?State=CA (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); see also Shipping Wine, UPS,
http://www.ups.com/content/us/en/resources/ship/packaging/guidelines/wine.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2014).
120Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp.2d at 600 (quoting Plaintiffs Supplemental Brief (DN 92), at 9, fn
6).
121 See Barber v. Commonwealth, 182 Ky. 200 (Ky. 1918); Jacksonville v. Chicago & A. R. Co.,
274 Ill. 152 (Ill. 1916); Carthage v. Munsell, 203 Ill. 474 (Ill. 1903).
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transaction does not occur in the county; rather, the sale occurs in the locale
of the winery. It seems that there should be no difference between (1) a
private consumer leaving the county, buying alcohol outside the county, and
bringing the alcohol back to his home and (2) a private consumer
purchasing wine from a winery outside the county, perhaps online, and a
common carrier instead being the one to bring the alcohol to the
consumer's home. Perhaps a solution that respects a county's right to be dry,
wet, or moist, the common carrier's business in those counties, and a private
consumer's protection to open commerce, is to ask the state legislature to
amend the statute to remove common carriers' liability.
IV. DIGESTIF: KENTUCKY MUST END ITS PROHIBITION HANGOVER
The Twenty-first Amendment applies to more than just wine.122 There
are many other artisan companies in the alcohol industry that are too small
for wholesalers and retailers to carry. From those developing craft beers to
those making small-batch bourbons, there are a number of companies with
interests across state lines. As demand for artisan products like these
skyrockets, so will online demand for these products, and these industries,
too, might face similar battles in courts. There will also likely be further
challenges to state alcohol sales systems, including the three-tiered model
and state-run liquor stores, though these challenges have yet to find much
success, 123 usually finding these bureaucratic systems serve "legitimate
regulatory purposes beyond protectionism."1 24 However, if there can be a
change of tide in the courts' views on protectionist state interests like there
was on Section Two of the Twenty-first Amendment, then there could
potentially be a restructuring of the entire alcohol direct-shipping industry
in this country.

Banner, supra note 15, at 284.
See Arnold's Wines Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Siesta Village Market
LLC v. Steen, 595 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2010).
124
Jacob Sullum, No Beer of the Month for You: Bewildering Restrictions on Booze by Mail, Reason
(Aug. 5, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2013/08/05/no-beer-of-the-month-for-youbewildering.
122See
1"
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As a result, consumers would see a greater variety and lower prices for
alcohol. Wholesalers and retailers would lose protection from the state, but
this would give them the incentive to compete for customers' business,
giving them an opportunity to draw in more business for delivering better
products to customers. Dry counties would still be able to limit alcohol sales
within their county lines, and if states want to discourage any effect of
increased drinking, then they have the ability to impose a nondiscriminatory sin tax on the increased alcohol consumption. However, even
though the Internet has created the engine necessary for the small winery
market to flourish, it seems as though it will still take years for state
regulation of the liquor industry to catch up. The industry will also have to
fend off further attacks, like Congress's attempt in 2010 with the CARE
Act (Comprehensive Alcohol Regulatory Effectiveness Act) to end direct
shipping of wine and other types of alcohol and put restrictions on
consumer and winery lawsuits attempting to reduce these protectionist
policies. 125 Essentially, such legislation would revert back to the idea that
Section Two of the Twenty-first Amendment is superior to the
Constitution's Commerce Clause and would not require a showing that a
state's discrimination of out-of-state liquor serves a legitimate government
interest.126
Kentucky has a confusing web of statutes, case law, and regulations
that impede out-of-state wineries and common carriers from even wanting
to try to do business in Kentucky. The Kentucky General Assembly must
act immediately to clarify or amend Kentucky law to free the Kentucky
wine market. Kentucky has been a leader in the wine industry before and
has the potential to become a leader again. If the General Assembly acts
now, then Kentucky can rise to the top of the American wine industry and
serve as a model of direct shipping success to other states, rather than try to
play catch up in the future.

12s
Comprehensive Alcohol Regulatory Effectiveness Act of 2010, H.R. 5034, 111th Cong.
(2010).

126Katherine Mangu-Ward, Wine Snobs and Suds Swillers Unite!, Reason (July 8, 2010),
http://reason.com/archives/2010/07/08/wine-snobs-and-suds-swillers-u.
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CHRISTOPHER W. FROST, Thomas P. Lewis Professor of Law. B.B.A.
1983, J.D. 1986, University of Kentucky
BRIAN L. FRYE, Assistant Professor of Law. B.A. 1994, University of
California at Berkley; M.F.A. 1997, San Francisco Art Institute;
J.D. 2005, New York University
EUGENE R. GAETKE, Edward T. Breathitt Professor of Law. B.A. 1971,
J.D. 1974, University of Minnesota
MARY LOUISE EVERETT GRAHAM, Senator Wendell H. Ford Professor
of Law. B.A. 1965, J.D. 1977, University of Texas
ROBERTA M. HARDING, Judge William T. Lafferty Professor of Law.
B.S. 1981, University of San Francisco; J.D. 1986, Harvard
University
KRISTIN J. HAZELWOOD, Assistant Professor of Legal Research and
Writing. B.A. 1996, University of Louisville; J.D. 1999,
Washington and Lee University
MICHAEL P. HEALY, Senator Wendell H. Ford Professor of Law. B.A.
1978, Williams College; J.D. 1984, University of Pennsylvania
NICOLE HUBERFELD, H. Wendell Cherry Professor of Law. B.A. 1995,
University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1998, Seton Hall University
MARK F. KIGHTLINGER, Edward T. Breathitt Associate Professor of Law.
B.A. 1981, Williams College; B.A. 1983, M.A. 1995, Cambridge
University, J.D. 1988, Yale University
ROBERT G. LAWSON, Frost, Brown & Todd Professor of Law. B.S. 1960,
Berea College; J.D. 1963, University of Kentucky
CORTNEY E. LOLLAR, Assistant Professor of Law. B.A. 1997, Brown
University, J.D. 2002, New York University
KATHRYN L. MOORE, Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor
of Law. A.B. 1983, University of Michigan; J.D. 1988, Cornell
University
MELYNDAJ. PRICE, Robert E. Harding, Jr. Associate Professor of Law.
B.S. 1995, Prairie View A&M University, J.D. 2002, University of
Texas; Ph.D. 2006, University of Michigan

PAUL E. SALAMANCA, Wyatt Tarrant & Combs Professor of Law. A.B.
1983, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1989, Boston College
COLLIN D. SCHUELER, Visiting Assistant Professor. B.S. 2006, University
of Michigan; J.D. 2010, University of Kentucky
ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, William L. Matthews, Jr. Professor of Law. B.A.
1967, Amherst College; J.D. 1970, Harvard University
RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD, William L. Matthews, Jr. Professor of Law.
B.A. 1969, J.D. 1976, The Ohio State University
HAROLD R. WEINBERG, Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor of Law. A.B.
1966, J.D. 1969, Case Western Reserve University, L.L.M. 1975,
University of Illinois
SARAH N. WELLING, Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor
of Law. B.A. 1974, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1978, University
of Kentucky
RICHARD A. WESTIN, Professor of Law. B.A. 1967, M.B.A. 1968,
Columbia University; J.D. 1972, University of Pennsylvania
ANDREW K. WOODS, Assistant Professor of Law. A.B. 2002, Brown
University; J.D. 2007, Harvard University; Ph.D. 2012, University
of Cambridge
ADJUNCT FACULTY
GLEN S. BAGBY, Adjunct Professor of Law. A.B. 1966, Transylvania
University; J.D. 1969, University of Kentucky. Law Firm:
Dinsmore & Shohl
DON P. CETRULO, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.A. 1971, Morehead State

University; J.D. 1974, University of Kentucky. Law Firm: Knox &
Cetrulo
HON. JENNIFER B. COFFMAN, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.A. 1969, J.D.
1978, University of Kentucky. Retired Chief Judge of Eastern
District of Kentucky
REBECCA DILORETO, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.A. 1981, Amherst
College; J.D. 1985, University of Kentucky. Children's Law Center
ANDREW D. DORISIO, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.S. 1980, West
Virginia University; J.D. 1996, University of Kentucky
JANET GRAHAM, Adjunct Professor of Law. Law Commissioner of the
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government
KAREN J. GREENWELL, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.A. 1976, J.D. 1985,
University of Kentucky. Law Firm: Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs LLP

PIERCE W. HAMBLIN, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.B.A. 1973, J.D. 1977,
University of Kentucky. Law Firm: Landrum & Shouse
JOHN HAYS, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.A. 1985, Princeton University;
J.D. 1988, University of Kentucky. Law Firm: Jackson Kelly
G. EDWARD HENRY II, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.A. 1976, J.D. 1979,
University of Kentucky. Law Firm: Henry Watz Raine & Marino
PAULA HOLBROOK, Adjunct Professor of Law. R.N. 1978, University of
Tennessee-Knoxville; B.H.S. 1990, J.D. 1993, University of
Kentucky. UK HealthCare
GUIONJOHNSTONE, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.A. 2005, Transylvania
University; M.S.W., J.D. 2011, University of Louisville. Director
of Maxwell Street Legal Clinic
EMILY JONES, Adjunct Professor of Law. J.D. 2011, University of
Kentucky. Kentucky Refugee Ministries
RAYMOND M. LARSON, Adjunct Professor of Law. J.D. 1970, University
of Kentucky. Fayette County Commonwealth Attorney
JOHN T. MCGARVEY, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.A. 1970, J.D. 1973,
University of Kentucky. Law Firm: Morgan & Pottinger
GEORGE MILLER, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.A. 1975, A.M. 1978,
Ph.D. 1981, Brown University; J.D. 1984, University of Kentucky.
Law Firm: Wyatt Tarrant & Combs
MARGARET M. PISACANO, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.S.N. 1980,
Vanderbilt University; J.D. 1983, University of Kentucky. Assistant
General Counsel and Director of Risk Management at University
of Kentucky's Chandler Medical Center
DAMON PRESTON, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.A. 1991, Transylvania
University; J.D. 1994, Harvard University. Deputy Public Advocate
STEVEN ROUSE, Adjunct Professor of Law. A.B. 1999, University of
Illinois; J.D. 2006, Northwestern University
THALETIA ROUTT, Adjunct Professor of Law. J.D. 2000, University of
Kentucky. Associate General Counsel for University of Kentucky
THOMAS E. RUTLEDGE, Adjunct Professor of Law. J.D. 1990, University
of Kentucky. Law Firm: Stoll Keenon Ogden
LINDA A. SMITH, Adjunct Professor of Law. J.D. 1994, Salmon P. Chase
College of Law
LARRY A. SYKES, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.A. 1975, Vanderbilt
University; J.D. 1983, University of Kentucky. Law Firm: Stoll
Keenon Ogden

WILLIAM E. THRO, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.A. 1986, Hanover
College; M.A. 1988, University of Melbourne; J.D. 1990,
University of Virginia. General Counsel of the University of
Kentucky
M. LEE TURPIN, Adjunct Professor of Law. J.D. 1992, University of
Kentucky. First Assistant County Attorney, Fayette County
Attorney's Office
ANDREA WELKER, Adjunct Professor of Law. B.A. 2005, M.A. 2008,
J.D. 2009, University of Kentucky
CHARLES P. WISDOM, JR., Adjunct Professor of Law. J.D. 1985,
University of Louisville. Chief, Appellate Section, US Attorney's
Office, Eastern District of Kentucky

